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Field note No. 02 · Foundations

Volatility targeting

Sizing positions by forecast risk to keep the risk carried roughly constant, and where the rule stops protecting.

Revised September 202620 min read20 references

Educational material only. Not investment advice.

Contents
  1. 01The rule
  2. 02Forecasting volatility
  3. 03What it achieves, and where
  4. 04A worked example
  5. 05A century of US data
  6. 06An interactive laboratory
  7. 07Costs, turnover and leverage caps
  8. 08Failure modes
  9. 09Implementation checklist
  10. —References

Abstract

The rule exposure = target volatility / forecast volatility; the estimators that feed it (rolling windows, EWMA, GARCH, range-based and realised volatility); why it stabilises risk in every asset class but improves Sharpe ratios mainly where expected returns do not rise with volatility, as in equities and credit; its turnover costs; a worked example; results on the US market and the momentum factor from 1927 to 2026; its failure modes; and an interactive laboratory on real and synthetic data with a volatility-matched benchmark.

Key takeaways

  • Returns are hard to forecast but volatility is not, because it clusters; volatility targeting uses that to size positions.
  • Define the estimator's memory once (span, half-life or decay factor); an EWMA with a half-life of a few weeks is a sensible default.
  • It reliably stabilises risk and reduces extreme losses. It improves the Sharpe ratio mainly where expected returns do not rise with volatility, notably equities and credit.
  • Judge it against a constant exposure with the same volatility, not against the unscaled asset.
  • It reacts after the event, cannot see jumps or gradual declines, and is most exposed after long calm periods.

Before you start

  • Daily returns, standard deviation and annualisation by the square root of time
  • Leverage, and how it scales both return and risk
  • Field note 01 is useful background but not required

Volatility targeting sizes a position in inverse proportion to its forecast volatility, so that the risk carried stays roughly constant: less exposure when an asset is turbulent, more when it is calm. This note sets out the rule, the estimators that feed it, the evidence on where it improves results and where it does not, its costs, and the situations in which it fails to protect.

The rule

Choose a target volatility, forecast the asset’s volatility, and size the position as their ratio:

wt  =  min( L,  σtarget / σt )
exposure held over day t

Here σtarget is the annualised volatility the strategy aims to run at, σt is the annualised forecast made at the close of day t − 1 from returns up to that close, and L is a cap on leverage. With a 10% target and an asset running at 20%, the rule holds half a unit of exposure; if the asset calms to 8%, it holds one and a quarter, subject to the cap.

Figure 1The daily sizing loop
Sizing loop: returns to forecast to target weight to band check to order to position, feeding back the next returntomorrow's inputReturnsup to close t−1Forecast σ̂ₜEWMA, span NTarget weightmin(L, σ* / σ̂ₜ)Band checktrade if |Δw| > b·wOrderat the closePosition over day tearns rₜ, pays costs
Information flows left to right once a day. The forecast and the weight use returns up to the close of day t − 1; the order executes and the position earns day t's return. The no-trade band sits between the target weight and the order.

The rule relies on an asymmetry in what can be forecast. Tomorrow’s return is very hard to predict; tomorrow’s volatility is substantially more predictable, because volatility clusters: large moves tend to follow large moves and quiet days tend to follow quiet days. Mandelbrot documented the pattern in commodity prices in the 1960s, and it is among the best-established regularities in financial returns.1,2 Volatility targeting uses that forecasting power for the one decision it can inform: the size of the position.

It is worth distinguishing the rule from a close relative. Scaling by 1/σ holds volatility constant. Scaling by 1/σ2, the weight a mean-variance investor would choose if expected returns did not change, varies exposure much more aggressively; that is the form studied by Moreira and Muir, discussed below.3

Forecasting volatility

Most of the design choices concern the forecast in the denominator. Every estimator trades responsiveness against noise: one that reacts quickly to a new regime also reacts to random fluctuations, and each reaction is a trade that must be paid for.

Rolling window

The root mean square of the last n daily returns (a standard deviation measured about zero), annualised by multiplying by √252. It is simple to explain and to audit. (On real data the laboratory uses the ordinary standard deviation about the mean, the realised_vol function listed in Field note 03 (Indicators, and the 200-day moving average); at daily frequency the two differ negligibly.) Its weakness is that every day in the window carries equal weight and then drops out at once, so the estimate jumps when an old shock leaves the window, weeks after anything actually happened.

Exponentially weighted moving average (EWMA)

Each day the daily variance estimate vt moves a fixed fraction of the way towards the latest squared return:

vt  =  λ · vt−1  +  (1 − λ) · rt−12,     σt = √(252 vt)
EWMA update; the annualised forecast is √(252 v_t)

Recent days count most and old days fade smoothly, so there is no cliff when a shock ages out. The memory can be described in three equivalent ways, and this note uses them consistently: the decay factor λ; the span N, with λ = 1 − 2/(N + 1); and the half-life, the number of days after which a return’s weight has halved, ln 0.5 / ln λ. J.P. Morgan’s RiskMetrics document popularised λ = 0.94 for daily data,4 a half-life of about 11 trading days. That value was calibrated for one-day value-at-risk. For sizing positions a longer memory is usually preferable, because it trades less: a half-life of roughly two to six weeks (about 10 to 30 trading days) is a reasonable range, and the laboratory below defaults to a span of 60 days, a half-life of 21.

site_research/fieldnotes/voltarget.py
def ewma_vol(ret: pd.Series, span: int = 60, periods: int = 252, seed_days: int = 20) -> pd.Series:
    """Annualised EWMA volatility with decay lambda = 1 - 2 / (span + 1).

    v_t = lambda * v_{t-1} + (1 - lambda) * r_t^2, seeded with the mean square of the first
    `seed_days` returns. The mean is taken as zero, which costs little at daily frequency.
    """
    lam = 1.0 - 2.0 / (span + 1.0)
    r2 = ret.pow(2).to_numpy()
    v = np.empty_like(r2)
    v[: seed_days] = np.nan
    acc = r2[:seed_days].mean()
    for t in range(seed_days, len(r2)):
        acc = lam * acc + (1.0 - lam) * r2[t]
        v[t] = acc
    return pd.Series(np.sqrt(v * periods), index=ret.index)
The estimator used for every real-data number in this note. The value at t includes r_t; the backtest applies the weight it produces from t + 1.

GARCH and related models

Engle’s ARCH model and Bollerslev’s generalisation, GARCH, make volatility clustering an explicit statistical model in which forecasts revert towards a long-run level.5,6 The GJR variant allows negative returns to raise volatility more than positive returns of the same size.7 An EWMA is the special case with no reversion. GARCH can therefore produce better multi-day forecasts; for a one-day-ahead sizing decision the two often differ little, and GARCH’s parameters must be estimated and can drift.

Range-based and intraday estimators

Closing prices discard most of what happens during the day. Estimators built from the daily open, high, low and close use more of it. Under idealised assumptions Parkinson’s high-low estimator is about five times, and Garman and Klass’s about seven times, as efficient as the close-to-close estimator;8,9 both are biased by discrete sampling and by overnight moves, which Yang and Zhang’s estimator is designed to handle.10 With intraday data, squared five-minute returns can be summed into a realised variance, and Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold and Labys showed that realised volatility can be modelled and forecast directly.11 The five-minute interval is a compromise against market-microstructure noise. Corsi’s HAR model, a regression on daily, weekly and monthly realised volatility, is a simple and robust way to forecast it.12 Better inputs give a less noisy forecast for the same responsiveness, which reduces turnover.

EstimatorResponse to a new regimeNoise in the estimateData required
Rolling windowSlow, then drops shocks abruptlyHigh for short windowsDaily closes
EWMASmooth; speed set by the half-lifeModerateDaily closes
GARCH familySmooth, with mean reversionLower, if the model fitsParameter estimation
Range-basedAs for its windowLower than close-to-closeOpen, high, low, close
Realised (intraday)FastLowest, if microstructure noise is handledClean intraday data

What it achieves, and where

Holding risk constant is, first, a risk-management device, and for most assets that is most of what it achieves. For some assets it also improves return per unit of risk. The evidence repays careful reading, because the headline results and the details differ.

Stable risk and a thinner left tail

Because volatility persists, a position scaled by a recent estimate carries much more stable risk than a fixed position: the realised volatility of a targeted strategy stays far closer to its target than the asset’s own volatility stays to its average. In the broadest study of the subject, Harvey and co-authors found that volatility targeting reduced the likelihood of extreme returns in every asset class they examined.13 This benefit is largely mechanical. It is also conditional: it depends on turbulence building up over several days, and it does not apply to a sudden jump that arrives while the position is large (see Failure modes).

When the Sharpe ratio improves

Whether volatility targeting also raises the Sharpe ratio depends on how an asset’s expected return moves with its volatility. If expected returns rose in proportion to volatility, cutting exposure in turbulent periods would give up return in proportion to the risk removed, and the Sharpe ratio would be unchanged. If expected returns do not rise with volatility, or fall, exposure is being cut precisely when the reward for bearing risk is lowest, and the Sharpe ratio improves. Even with a constant expected return there is a small mechanical gain, because the average of 1/σ exceeds 1/√(average of σ2).

In equities the evidence points to the favourable case. Black and Christie documented that stock prices and volatility tend to move in opposite directions, the so-called leverage effect;14,15 the name is partly a misnomer, since Christie found that financial leverage explains only part of it, and a competing explanation, volatility feedback, runs from higher volatility to lower prices through a higher required return.16 (The leverage effect is unrelated to the leverage cap in the rule above.) Moreira and Muir found that portfolios scaled by the inverse of recent variance earned positive and mostly significant alphas relative to the unmanaged versions of the market and several equity factors, because expected returns did not rise in step with variance.3 Earlier, Fleming, Kirby and Ostdiek showed that investors would pay a meaningful fee to time volatility in an asset-allocation setting,17 and Barroso and Santa-Clara found that scaling equity momentum by its own recent volatility largely removed its crashes and roughly doubled its Sharpe ratio in their sample.18

Harvey and co-authors, working across more than sixty assets, found Sharpe-ratio improvements for equities and credit, which they attributed to the leverage effect, and little change for government bonds, currencies and commodities.13 Their results are a reasonable baseline expectation.

The sceptical evidence

Two cautions apply to the stronger claims. Moreira and Muir’s scaling constant, and the combination of managed and unmanaged portfolios implied by their alphas, are estimated over the full sample. Cederburg, O’Doherty, Wang and Yan tested variance-managed versions of 103 equity strategies and found that, once those choices had to be made in real time, the managed versions did not systematically outperform.19 On balance, the evidence supports volatility targeting as a reliable way to stabilise risk and reduce the frequency of extreme losses, and as a conditional, asset-dependent way to improve the Sharpe ratio.

A worked example

A single day of arithmetic shows the mechanism, and why the rule reacts after the event. Take a 12% target and an EWMA forecast with λ = 0.94. The current daily volatility estimate is 1.00%, which annualises to 15.9%. The position is therefore 12% / 15.9% = 0.76 units of exposure.

The asset then falls 3% in a day. The position loses 0.76 × 3% = 2.27% of capital: the rule could not anticipate the move, so the first day of turbulence is always taken at the previous size. At the close the estimate updates:

v  =  0.94 × (1.00%)2  +  0.06 × (3%)2  =  0.000148

That is a daily volatility of 1.22%, or 19.3% annualised, so the next day’s position becomes 12% / 19.3% = 0.62. One large day reduced exposure by about 18%, and exposure recovers only as subsequent calm days dilute the shock.

Before the moveAfter the move
Daily volatility estimate1.00%1.22%
Annualised (× √252)15.9%19.3%
Position for a 12% target0.76×0.62×

Values computed from the formulas above.

A century of US data

The rule is easy to test on public data. The Kenneth R. French Data Library publishes the daily total return of the US stock market (the CRSP value-weighted index) and of the momentum factor back to 1926, with the one-month Treasury bill return. Applying the rule with a 12% target, an EWMA with a 60-day span, a 2× cap, a ±10% no-trade band and 5 bp per unit traded, from 1927-05-05 to 2026-08-31, gives the following. Unused capital earns T-bills; the momentum factor is self-financing and holds no cash leg.

US market, Sharpe ratio
0.57
matched constant exposure 0.46
US market, worst drawdown
-56%
matched -72%, unscaled -84%
Momentum, Sharpe ratio
1.02
matched constant exposure 0.49
Momentum, worst drawdown
-42%
matched -69%, unscaled -72%
Market 1×Market, matchedMarket, targetedMomentum 1×Momentum, matchedMomentum, targeted
Annual return10.2%8.5%9.9%5.7%5.3%12.0%
Annual volatility17.5%12.6%12.6%12.9%11.8%11.8%
Sharpe ratio0.460.460.570.490.491.02
Worst drawdown-84.1%-71.8%-55.9%-72.3%-68.7%-42.1%
Worst day-17.4%-12.5%-10.5%-18.5%-17.0%-12.4%
Turnover a year001.8×001.7×

Kenneth R. French Data Library, daily, 1927-05-05 to 2026-08-31. Market Sharpe ratios are of returns in excess of T-bills; momentum returns are long-short returns earning no interest on collateral, so they are not comparable with the market's. "Matched" is a constant exposure scaled after the fact to the targeted path's volatility (0.72× for the market, 0.92× for momentum). Annualised from the calendar: US markets also traded on Saturdays until 1952.

Two results stand out, and both agree with the literature. On the market, the targeted rule beat the volatility-matched constant exposure on Sharpe ratio (0.57 against 0.46) and on drawdown. The gain of 0.10 is modest relative to its uncertainty: resampling whole calendar years gives it a standard error of about 0.06. The gain is not concentrated in the famous crashes: summed by decade, the targeted rule’s excess return over the matched exposure was largest in the 1940s and 1950s and was negative in the 1930s, the 1970s and the 2020s, when volatility spiked and then fell before the rule had rebuilt its exposure. The improvement is a long-run average, not insurance. On momentum the effect is much larger and much clearer: against the matched exposure the Sharpe ratio roughly doubled (0.49 to 1.02, standard error of the gain about 0.08) and the worst drawdown fell from -69% to -42%, close to what Barroso and Santa-Clara reported with a different estimator,18 because momentum’s crashes arrive in high-volatility rebounds.20 (The unscaled factor’s worst drawdown is not one crash but a decade, from 1932 to 1942; see Field note 01 (Market anomalies).) These are full-sample, single-path results with parameters chosen in advance rather than tuned; the laboratory below lets the reader vary them and see how much the conclusions depend on the choices.

The whole backtest is two functions: the sizing rule with its band, and a loop that lags the weight, charges costs and holds cash.

site_research/fieldnotes/voltarget.py
def target_weights(forecast: pd.Series, target: float = 0.12, cap: float = 2.0,
                   band: float = 0.0) -> pd.Series:
    """w = min(cap, target / forecast), traded only when it moves more than `band` (a fraction of
    the current weight) away from the weight held."""
    raw = (target / forecast).clip(upper=cap)
    held = np.full(len(raw), np.nan)
    cur = np.nan
    for i, x in enumerate(raw.to_numpy()):
        if np.isnan(x):
            continue
        if np.isnan(cur) or abs(x - cur) > band * cur:
            cur = x
        held[i] = cur
    return pd.Series(held, index=raw.index).fillna(0.0)
site_research/fieldnotes/backtest.py
def run(ret: pd.Series, weight: pd.Series, cash: pd.Series | None = None,
        cost: float = 0.0, lag: int = 1) -> pd.DataFrame:
    """Daily P&L of holding `weight` in `ret`, the rest in `cash`.

    lag=1: the weight decided at close t earns the return of t+1 (trade at the signal's close).
    lag=2: trade one period later.  lag=0: LOOK-AHEAD (the signal earns its own day's return).
    cost:  a fraction of capital charged on every unit of exposure traded (0.001 = 10 bp).
    """
    w = weight.shift(lag).fillna(0.0)
    cash = pd.Series(0.0, index=ret.index) if cash is None else cash.reindex(ret.index).fillna(0.0)
    traded = w.diff().abs().fillna(w.abs())
    pnl = w * ret + (1.0 - w) * cash - cost * traded
    return pd.DataFrame({"ret": pnl, "weight": w, "traded": traded})
site_research/fieldnotes/backtest.py
def stats(pnl: pd.Series, cash: pd.Series, periods: float | None = None,
          weight: pd.Series | None = None) -> dict:
    """The summary every table in the notes reports.

    periods=None annualises from the calendar: observations per year are counted from the
    dates, which matters for US data before 1952, when markets also traded on Saturdays.
    """
    wealth = (1.0 + pnl).cumprod()
    years = years_spanned(pnl.index) if periods is None else len(pnl) / periods
    periods = len(pnl) / years
    excess = pnl - cash.reindex(pnl.index).fillna(0.0)
    vol = pnl.std(ddof=1) * np.sqrt(periods)
    out = {
        "cagr": wealth.iloc[-1] ** (1.0 / years) - 1.0,
        "vol": vol,
        "sharpe": excess.mean() * periods / (excess.std(ddof=1) * np.sqrt(periods)),
        "max_dd": (wealth / wealth.cummax().clip(lower=1.0) - 1.0).min(),
        "worst_day": pnl.min(),
    }
    if weight is not None:
        out["time_in_market"] = weight.mean()
        out["switches"] = int((weight.diff().abs() > 1e-12).sum())
        out["turnover"] = weight.diff().abs().sum() / years
    return out
Every table in the series reports these statistics. Drawdowns are measured from a starting value of one, so an early loss counts.

An interactive laboratory

The laboratory runs the same computation in the browser, ported line for line from the Python above (the site’s build checks that the port reproduces the table). Choose the US market, the momentum factor, or twelve years (eleven after warm-up) of synthetic returns from a volatility-clustering process with fat tails, a stronger volatility response to falls than to rises and two one-day jumps that no forecast could anticipate. The synthetic series holds the expected return constant, so it isolates the mechanical effect of volatility clustering. In every case the weight for a day is set from returns up to the previous close.

The fair comparison is not the asset at exposure one, which at about 17% volatility (the US market here, and the synthetic series) is simply a riskier position than a 12% target, but a constant exposure scaled to the same realised volatility as the targeted strategy (scaled after the fact, so it is a yardstick rather than a strategy anyone could have run). The difference between those two is the value of timing the exposure. Across 40 synthetic histories with a 12% target, a 60-day span, a 2× cap and no band, the targeted strategy’s Sharpe ratio exceeded the matched constant exposure’s by +0.03 on average, with a standard deviation of 0.11, and was higher in 26 of the 40. Over eleven years, a difference of that size cannot be distinguished from zero on any single history, which is why the real-data results above, a century long, carry more weight. The synthetic history shown first is a median draw.

Figure 2A volatility-targeting laboratory
Data
Estimator
Leverage cap
No-trade band
Trading cost

1927-05-05 to 2026-08-31 (103 years from 1927): targeting 12%, realised volatility came in at 12.6% and 63-day volatility stayed within a quarter of the target 83% of the time. Against a constant exposure with the same volatility, the Sharpe ratio was 0.57 versus 0.46 and the worst drawdown -55.9% versus -71.8%, for 1.8× turnover a year.

Growth of 1 (log scale)0.40.60.813579204060801003005007009002k4k6k8k10kRealised volatility, 63-day0%20%40%60%80%target 12%Exposure held0×1×2×3×cap 2×1930194019501960197019801990200020102020
Exposure 1×Volatility-targetedConstant exposure, matched volatilityTarget
1927-05-05 to 2026-08-31 (103 years from 1927)Exposure 1×Constant, matched volVol-targeted
Annual return compound10.2%8.5%9.9%
Annual volatility realised17.5%12.6%12.6%
Sharpe ratio excess over T-bills0.460.460.57
Worst drawdown peak to trough-84.1%-71.8%-55.9%
Worst day-17.4%-12.5%-10.5%
Average exposure1.00×0.72×0.99×
Turnover one-way0.0× a year0.0× a year1.8× a year

Kenneth R. French Data Library (Dartmouth): daily Fama-French factors and momentum factor, CRSP-based. mkt = Mkt-RF + RF (US market total return); rf = one-month T-bill; mom = momentum factor. Weights are decided at each close from returns up to that close and applied from the next day. The matched column is a constant exposure scaled after the fact to the vol-targeted path’s volatility: a yardstick, not a strategy anyone could have run.

US market and momentum: Kenneth R. French Data Library, daily, 1927 to 2026. Top: growth of one unit at exposure one, for the volatility-targeted strategy, and for a constant exposure matched to its realised volatility. Middle: realised 63-day volatility against the target. Bottom: the exposure held, and its cap. Suggested experiments: shorten the span and watch turnover rise; remove the band and watch it rise again; switch to the momentum factor and find the 1932 and 2009 crashes; on synthetic data, draw further histories and watch how much the comparison with the matched exposure varies.

Two properties recur. On the synthetic histories and on the market, realised volatility runs somewhat above the target (by about 5% on average across the synthetic histories; 12.6% against 12% on the market), because estimation noise in the denominator, fat tails and jumps all push in the same direction; a practitioner may set the target slightly below the level actually wanted. On momentum it lands slightly below (11.8%), because the 2× cap binds in its calmest stretches. And the stability of risk, visible in the middle panel, is far more reliable than any improvement in return.

Costs, turnover and leverage caps

Every change in the forecast is a trade, so the estimator’s noise becomes a cost. In the laboratory’s synthetic history with no band, an EWMA with a 10-day span turns over about 22 times capital a year (one-way), roughly 112 basis points of return a year at a 5 bp cost; a 120-day span turns over about 1.9 times. Three practices keep this under control.

  • Use a longer memory than intuition suggests. A fast estimator reacts sooner to a crash but also to every false signal. In the synthetic tests here, half-lives of a few weeks (the best was about two) outperformed half-lives of a few days after costs.
  • Trade only when the difference is material. A no-trade band, for example rebalancing only when the target exposure differs from the current one by more than 10% of the current position, removes most of the small adjustments that pay the spread for little benefit.
  • Cap leverage, and consider a floor. In very calm markets the rule calls for high leverage precisely when volatility is most likely to rise from a low base. A cap limits this, and a minimum exposure can prevent a strategy from remaining almost flat for months after a single shock. The backtests here finance leverage at the T-bill rate; a real account pays a spread over it, and rebalancing the drift of prices back to the target weight is a further cost these tables leave out (small at these turnovers).

Failure modes

Volatility targeting reduces risk on average. It is not insurance, and its failures are predictable enough to plan for.

  • It reacts after the event. The forecast is built from past returns, so the first day of a volatility spike is taken at the previous size, as the worked example shows. The rule protects against the second week of a crisis, not its first day.
  • It cannot see jumps. A price gap after an announcement, or while the market is closed, occurs between two forecasts, and no stop order can execute inside it. Across 40 synthetic histories, the targeted strategy’s single worst day was worse than the matched constant exposure’s in 27, because a jump can arrive while exposure is elevated after a calm spell (in the median synthetic history the two were almost identical: -5.9% against -6.0%).
  • Exposure is highest after calm periods. Low realised volatility produces the largest positions, and long calm periods can end abruptly. This is the case for a leverage cap and for scepticism about very low forecasts.
  • Gradual declines pass unnoticed. A market that falls steadily in small steps can keep realised volatility low while prices fall a long way. The rule reads this as calm and remains fully invested.
  • Similar rules may trade together. Many investors use related rules. After a shock they may all reduce exposure at once, which can add to the move they are responding to, and execution is likely to be worst when the rule is most active.
  • Backtests can use information not yet available. Sizing a position with a volatility estimate that includes the same day’s return is look-ahead and flatters every result. Size on information available before the trade, and charge the cost of every adjustment.

Implementation checklist

A short checklist for a first implementation:

  1. Choose one estimator and a moderate memory (an EWMA with a half-life of a few weeks is a sensible start), and do not tune it to the backtest.
  2. Compute the forecast from data up to the previous close, state when the trade executes, and record both.
  3. Set a leverage cap before looking at results, and a no-trade band sized to trading costs.
  4. Judge the rule first on realised volatility against target, drawdowns and the left tail, compared with a constant exposure of the same volatility, and only then on the Sharpe ratio.
  5. Stress-test it with jumps and gradual declines, the two situations it cannot detect.
  6. When running several strategies, decide whether to target each one, the portfolio, or both, and record why.

References

  1. Mandelbrot, B. (1963). The variation of certain speculative prices. Journal of Business, 36(4), 394-419.
  2. Cont, R. (2001). Empirical properties of asset returns: Stylized facts and statistical issues. Quantitative Finance, 1(2), 223-236.
  3. Moreira, A., & Muir, T. (2017). Volatility-managed portfolios. Journal of Finance, 72(4), 1611-1644.
  4. J.P. Morgan / Reuters (1996). RiskMetrics: Technical document (4th ed.). Morgan Guaranty Trust Company, New York.
  5. Engle, R. F. (1982). Autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity with estimates of the variance of United Kingdom inflation. Econometrica, 50(4), 987-1007.
  6. Bollerslev, T. (1986). Generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity. Journal of Econometrics, 31(3), 307-327.
  7. Glosten, L. R., Jagannathan, R., & Runkle, D. E. (1993). On the relation between the expected value and the volatility of the nominal excess return on stocks. Journal of Finance, 48(5), 1779-1801.
  8. Parkinson, M. (1980). The extreme value method for estimating the variance of the rate of return. Journal of Business, 53(1), 61-65.
  9. Garman, M. B., & Klass, M. J. (1980). On the estimation of security price volatilities from historical data. Journal of Business, 53(1), 67-78.
  10. Yang, D., & Zhang, Q. (2000). Drift-independent volatility estimation based on high, low, open, and close prices. Journal of Business, 73(3), 477-491.
  11. Andersen, T. G., Bollerslev, T., Diebold, F. X., & Labys, P. (2003). Modeling and forecasting realized volatility. Econometrica, 71(2), 579-625.
  12. Corsi, F. (2009). A simple approximate long-memory model of realized volatility. Journal of Financial Econometrics, 7(2), 174-196.
  13. Harvey, C. R., Hoyle, E., Korgaonkar, R., Rattray, S., Sargaison, M., & Van Hemert, O. (2018). The impact of volatility targeting. Journal of Portfolio Management, 45(1), 14-33.
  14. Black, F. (1976). Studies of stock price volatility changes. Proceedings of the 1976 Meetings of the American Statistical Association, Business and Economic Statistics Section, 177-181.
  15. Christie, A. A. (1982). The stochastic behavior of common stock variances: Value, leverage and interest rate effects. Journal of Financial Economics, 10(4), 407-432.
  16. Campbell, J. Y., & Hentschel, L. (1992). No news is good news: An asymmetric model of changing volatility in stock returns. Journal of Financial Economics, 31(3), 281-318.
  17. Fleming, J., Kirby, C., & Ostdiek, B. (2001). The economic value of volatility timing. Journal of Finance, 56(1), 329-352.
  18. Barroso, P., & Santa-Clara, P. (2015). Momentum has its moments. Journal of Financial Economics, 116(1), 111-120.
  19. Cederburg, S., O’Doherty, M. S., Wang, F., & Yan, X. (2020). On the performance of volatility-managed portfolios. Journal of Financial Economics, 138(1), 95-117.
  20. Daniel, K., & Moskowitz, T. J. (2016). Momentum crashes. Journal of Financial Economics, 122(2), 221-247.